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ABSTRACT
In the last decade RFID technology has become a major contender for managing large scale logistics 
operations and generating and distributing the massive amount of data involved in such operations. 
One of the main obstacles to the widespread deployment and adoption of RFID systems is the security 
issues inherent in them. This is compounded by a noticeable lack of literature on how to identify the 
vulnerabilities of a RFID system and then effectively identify and develop counter measures to combat 
the threats posed by those vulnerabilities. In this chapter, the authors develop a conceptual framework 
for analysing the threats, attacks, and security requirements pertaining to networked RFID systems. 
The vulnerabilities of, and the threats to, the system are identified using the threat model. The security 
framework itself consists of two main concepts: (1) the attack model, which identifies and classifies the 
possible attacks, and (2) the system model, which identifies the security requirements. The framework 
gives readers a method with which to analyse the threats any given system faces. Those threats can then 
be used to identify the attacks possible on that system and get a better understanding of those attacks. 
It also allows the reader to easily identify all the security requirements of that system and identify how 
those requirements can be met.
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INTRODUCTION
Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) is an 
automatic identification technology that is based 
on a contact-less, proximity based communication 
method (radio waves). The potential applications 
of RFID systems are diverse and RFID networks 
already exist in a large range of environments and 
applications. The proliferation of RFID networks 
has been rapid in the last decade (Schuster, et al., 
2007). One specific area in which the use of RFID 
technology has become increasingly popular is in 
massively networked logistics applications such 
as global supply-chain management systems. The 
use of RFID tags instead of barcodes allow for the 
automated identification and tracking of the tagged 
objects. In addition RFID systems can generate a 
vast amount of transactional data concerning the 
tagged objects that can then be shared in real time 
with the other partners of the system. But, as with 
all technologies there are a number of issues that 
prevent its widespread adoption. In RFID the main 
current barrier to adoption is the large number of 
security concerns about networked RFID systems 
and the additional performance overhead placed 
on the system when generating and sharing such 
a vast quantity of data.
Networked RFID systems are a relatively 
complex type of RFID system. This complexity 
arises from some of its features such as wireless 
communication, mobile data containers (RFID 
tags), highly distributed nature and the presence 
of multiple independent entities that are authorized 
to access the system. Due to its wireless commu-
nication method and distributed nature networked 
RFID systems are vulnerable to a great number 
of malicious attacks at the edge of the system 
(tags, readers and wireless communications). 
These attacks can range from simple ones such 
as passive jamming and eavesdropping to more 
sophisticated attacks such as physical cloning of 
tags, man in the middle attacks and even RFID 
malware (Karygicmnis, et al., 2006). In RFID sys-
tems these threats can be mounted either through 
physical or logical access to system components. 
In addition, networked RFID systems can be 
attacked by internal partners as well as external 
attackers. Therefore the security threats and at-
tacks that are faced by RFID networks are both 
numerous and extremely diverse. To successfully 
manage and eliminate all these different types of 
threats a large number of security requirements 
must be implemented.
Due to the large number and different types of 
attacks and threats facing a RFID system, fully 
securing it is a very complex task. This task is 
made even more difficult by the number of dif-
ferent components that must be protected and the 
large number of security concepts that must be 
upheld. Currently one of the biggest barriers to the 
widespread adoption of networked RFID systems 
is the unresolved security issues inherent in them 
(Juels, 2006). Without a proper security framework 
to reference most companies have no method 
with which to reliably access the vulnerabilities 
of their system. Nor do they have a method with 
which to decide how best they can remove those 
vulnerabilities and fully secure their RFID sys-
tems. Due to this fear over RFID system security 
most companies are still reluctant to implement 
RFID based solutions even though the benefits 
they pose are great. Therefore the need for a RFID 
security framework that will allow developers to 
successfully identify, manage and secure against 
the threats and attacks faced by RFID systems 
is currently very acute. But if such a framework 
is to be successfully developed a few challenges 
must first be overcome. Networked RFID systems, 
while seemingly similar to normal networked 
systems, differ quite significantly from them. 
Therefore the most important challenge is analys-
ing how the security requirements of networked 
RFID differ from the security requirements of 
typical networked systems.
There is a currently number of security frame-
works that are available in literature. But a majority 
of the current existing security frameworks are 
aimed at general networked systems (Jeong & 
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Haas, 2007; McGee, et al., 2004). Because the 
architecture of massively networked RFID ap-
plications is significantly different from typical IT 
networks and standalone RFID systems (further 
discussed in section 2) these frameworks do not 
take into account the differences of a networked 
RFID system and therefore cannot be fully applied 
to those systems. In addition some of the frame-
works only look at the possible threats and do not 
look at how those threats can be mitigated, while 
some others only look at standalone RFID and not 
at networked RFID (Rotter, 2008). Therefore most 
of these frameworks are either not applicable to 
networked RFID systems or they are insufficiently 
detailed to fully secure a networked RFID system.
If a security framework for networked RFID 
was successfully developed it would ensure that 
the companies that are implementing RFID solu-
tions could easily analyse and verify the security 
of those systems leading to higher adoption rates 
for networked RFID. Therefore in this chapter we 
develop and present “A networked RFID security 
framework.” As a precursor to developing the 
security framework we develop a threat model 
which analyses the threats faced by networked 
RFID systems, the vulnerabilities they exploit 
and the attacks that result. The actual framework 
will be composed of two main components (1) 
The attack model: which identifies and classifies 
all possible attacks on networked RFID systems, 
and (2) the system model which identifies all se-
curity requirements needed to protect a networked 
RFID system. The developed security framework 
will create a systematic path to identifying all 
the potential threats to any given RFID applica-
tion, better understanding the attacks that can be 
mounted on the system and also identifying the 
security requirements for securing the system.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as 
follows: The next section presents the conceptual 
model for a networked RFID system and identi-
fies the key differences between networked RFID 
systems, standalone RFID systems and general 
networked systems. It also illustrates what a net-
worked RFID system is by using a RFID enabled 
global supply chain management system as an 
example. The following section presents the cur-
rent research in the area and identifies some key 
weaknesses we are trying remover. The section 
titled Threat model presents and analyses the 
threat model that applies to this type of system. 
The section titled security framework contains 
the developed security framework for networked 
RFID while the section after that shows how the 
framework can be applied to a RFID system. Next 
we identify some possible future research direction 
for the work presented in this section as well as 
other possible research areas we have identified 
as being important. The final section presents the 
conclusions of this chapter.
BACKGROUND
In this section we will describe the basic conceptual 
model of a networked RFID system and its opera-
tion. We also clearly differentiate it from normal 
networked RFID systems and standalone RFID 
systems by identifying the differences between 
these different types of systems. We will also 
present the threat model specific to the system 
in question
Networked RFID System Model
The most important component of a networked 
RFID system is the RFID tag. RFID tags used in 
networked systems are typically low cost passive 
tags with update functionality. The items in the 
system are tagged with a RFID tag when they 
are first manufactured. The tag will always hold 
a unique identifier which allows the system to 
associate data stored in the backend databases 
with the attached item. When a new RFID tag is 
entered in the system the manufacturer of the item 
allocates its identification number. He then stores 
any data concerning that item in a secure database 
that can be accessed by any partner who needs 
88
A Security Framework for Networked RFID
that data. Because the RFID tags are physically 
attached to objects they are relatively less secure 
that typical data storage devices in networked 
IT systems (Glover & Bhatt, 2006). In addition, 
most large networked RFID system need to use 
very low cost RFID tags. Therefore the amount 
of resources available on those tags (both perfor-
mance and power wise) is considerably low and 
it is nearly impossible to implement the standard 
cryptographic security measures employed in IT 
networks on those tags. But because the RFID tags 
contain a memory module that contains sensitive 
data it’s still imperative that the data stored on 
the tag be secure from both logical and physical 
access (see Figure 1).
The tagged items are then transported along 
the network while passing from one partner to 
another. Along the way these tags items will come 
in contact with the RFID readers of partners of 
the system. RFID readers are used to read and 
write data to and from RFID tags. They are com-
posed of three main parts: the receiver, transmit-
ter and controller (Hassan & Chatterjee, 2006). 
A RFID reader needs to manage the large number 
of simultaneous transmissions it may receive and 
respond to them (Tajima, 2007). In systems that 
employ passive RFID tags the readers must also 
provide power to the tags (Glover & Bhatt, 2006). 
The readers also need to read the identifier and 
any additional data stored on any authenticated 
tags within reader distance and update the data 
on the when necessary (Ranasinghe, et al., 2005). 
When an authorized reader comes in contact with 
a RFID tag it first retrieves the identifier of the 
tag. That identifier and any other data stored on 
the tag is then passed on to the RFID middleware 
of the system.
The RFID middleware is arguably the most 
complex component of the system. It needs to 
carry out a number of different tasks to ensure that 
Figure 1. Networked RFID architecture
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the overall RFID system functions correctly. The 
middleware filters and collects the data received 
from RFID tag as low cost RFID tags are notorious 
for bad and false reads. The middleware also needs 
to carry out most of the security tasks to ensure 
the integrity and authenticity of the tags and the 
data received from them (Juels, 2006). Systems 
employing the EPCGlobal architecture translate 
the EPC and data retrieved according to the tag 
data specification as data is stored in binary for-
mat on the tag. The middleware also aggregates, 
filters and formats RFID tag data as required by 
the enterprise applications. The middleware also 
generates transaction data based on business events 
(Christian & Matthias, 2005). Therefore when it 
receives tag data from readers the middleware 
first filters it to ensure that they are not false or 
bad reads. Then any security functionality is car-
ried out to ensure that the data is safe to be used. 
The middleware then locates any additional data 
locations using a lookup service and retrieves 
any required information from those partners’ 
data servers. It then uses preset business rules to 
generate transaction data, associates that data with 
the identifier and stores that data in the system 
database. The middleware also communicates 
with other applications that require RFID data and 
retrieve that data; either from the local database or 
from partners databases and forwards it to them. 
This architecture is very different from normal 
networked systems which typically do not have 
a dedicated middleware component, as different 
partner applications communicate directly with 
each other as required.
The centralized lookup service is what allows 
different independent partners to locate and com-
municate with each other (Schuster, et al., 2007). 
In some very large networked RFID systems all the 
partners of the system may not even directly know 
each other or of each other’s existence (Tajima, 
2007). This is normally different from networked 
IT systems as in those systems all partners who 
communicate with each other directly know each 
other as well. Therefore networked RFID systems 
require a method with which the partners can locate 
all the data stored in the overall system concerning 
a specific tag. This service is normally run by an 
independent entity that is trusted by all partners. 
In EPCGlobal systems this service is provided 
by the EPCGlobal ONS service. The lookup di-
rectory needs to have the identification numbers 
of all the RFID tags of the system. It also needs 
to know the location of all the data concerning 
each specific RFID tag and the details on how to 
contact that data server.
The RFID repository is where the data concern-
ing the tagged objects are stored. In some systems 
the data servers are only accessible by the RFID 
middleware, and internal or external applications 
which need to access that data need to do so 
through the RFID middleware. In other systems 
these servers can be directly accessed by partner 
applications (Armenio, et al., 2007). Either way 
the RFID repository needs to allow more access 
to its data by external entities and programs than 
is typically allowed in IT systems. In addition the 
data stored in the RFID data servers are stored 
in as granular a form as possible to preserve as 
much of the information as possible. It is up to the 
querying middleware or the business applications 
to extract the required information from the raw 
data and format it in a way that can be used by 
the business applications.
The business applications use the data received 
from the RFID system to carryout existing business 
processes (Floerkemeier & Lampe, 2005). They 
may also update the data stored in the repository 
or the RFID tags based on their processes. These 
applications are mostly pre-existing ones that 
have been modified to integrate with the RFID 
system and use the information supplied by the 
RFID middleware (Asif & Mandviwalla, 2005). 
They retrieve information as required by either 
going through the middleware or by directly 
communicating with the external and internal 
RFID data repositories. Therefore in networked 
RFID systems the business applications must be 
modified to directly communicate with either the 
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middleware of the system or other partners RFID 
repositories. Unlike in typical networks where the 
different partners have data format and storage 
standards and agreements the business applica-
tions using a networked RFID system may be 
required to use data stored in a number of different 
formats and granulites by different partners. The 
retrieved data is then used to automate, improve 
and streamline existing business processes.
As in any networked system all these different 
components have to be connected by a communica-
tion network. The networks used in RFID systems 
can be divided into two main parts: the internal 
network and the external network. The internal 
network (shown in the green lines above) connects 
the components of a single partner together. This 
part of the network typically consists of a LAN 
or WAN and is protected from outside intrusion 
by the partner’s firewall and intrusion detection 
and prevention software. The external network 
on the other hand connects the components of 
different partners together, as well as connecting 
the middleware of the systems with the central-
ized lookup service for the overall system (Li & 
Ding, 2007). This part of the network is generally 
implemented over the internet and typically has 
very little security other than what’s provided at 
each end.
Networked RFID Example
The best example for a truly large scale networked 
RFID system is the global supply chain manage-
ment systems being deployed by large retailers 
such as Wal-Mart. The RFID systems in this case 
spans all the way from the initial raw materials 
manufacturer to the final retailer who sells the end 
product to the consumer and in some cases even 
continues past sales. When raw materials are first 
generated and packed those packages are attached 
with a RFID tag. Then the manufacturer stores 
static information such as date, batch number, and 
price and expiry date of that package on either the 
tag itself or the backend database. He may also 
associate transaction data such as who bought that 
package, and to where it should be delivered with 
the specific RFID tag as they become available. 
When the logistics get that package they use that 
data to properly deliver that package. They also 
update the data in their backend database with 
details such as unit’s current location and the 
shipment and transport truck it’s been attached to. 
This kind of ‘transactional data” is automatically 
generated and will be constantly updated in a large 
number of different repositories as new readers 
pick up that specific RFID tag and the middleware 
associates new business processes with that item.
When the final product producer receives 
that item he unpacks it and uses the raw materi-
als contained inside to create products. These 
products each have new RFID tags but those tags 
are also linked with the tags of the raw materi-
als packages they were developed from. Once 
again the producer stores static information on 
either the tag or the back end and then the final 
products starts moving alone the supply chain 
moving from each partner to partner. At differ-
ent points in this chain each partner generates 
more and more transactional data concerning the 
products attached to each tag and stores them in 
his personal RFID repository. As can be imagined 
most of time each partner is only aware of the 
partner directly up and down chain of him. (e.g., 
a logistics company moving goods between the 
producer and the distributor only know about 
those two partners, Likewise the final retailer 
is only aware of the distributor he received the 
goods from not the logistic companies that did the 
transport at each leg of the journey). But while 
they may not know the other partners they still 
need to access all the transactional data that was 
generated by each partner if the full power of the 
RFID system is to be leveraged. Therefore they 
need to be able to locate all the data repositories 
that contain information about any given RFID 
tag. This is where the EPCGlobal comes in. The 
EPCGlobal provides services that allow partners 
to identify the data repositories anywhere in the 
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world that contain information about any given 
tag. Different companies use different business 
applications and place more importance on dif-
ferent types of data. Therefore the data stored in 
each repository must not only contain as much 
information as possible but it must also be able to 
carter to the data format requirements of a large 
number of different business applications.
CURRENT RESEARCH ISSUES
As the following sections illustrate RFID systems 
have the following unique features that set them 
apart from typical IT network systems: (1) unlike 
most IT systems which are accessible by a single 
authorized entity, the RFID tags of the system need 
to need to be fully accessible by all partners in the 
network. (2) Unlike other data storage devices in 
IT systems the RFID tag is much more physically 
accessible by attackers. (3) Low security resulting 
from the lack of resources available on RFID tags 
makes the wireless communications of the system 
highly vulnerable to attackers. (5) The mobile 
nature of RFID tags make it possible to invade the 
privacy of the system without ever gaining access 
to the communications or the memory modules 
of the system. (6) Even the internal components 
such as the RFID repository and the middleware 
needs to allow considerably more external access 
compared to internal components of a normal 
networked system. (7) The data storage and data 
the formatting may be completely different from 
partner to partner and (8) Some of the different 
partners of the system may not even know each 
other at all (Li & Ding, 2007).
Additionally networked RFID systems also 
have a few main features that set them apart from 
standalone RFID systems. (1) Networked RFID 
systems have a number of users while standalone 
RFID systems have only one user. (2) The tags of 
networked RFID systems are comparatively a lot 
more mobile and physically accessible by attackers 
than the tags of a standalone RFID system and 
(3) overall system structure for standalone RFID 
is considerably simpler than the system structure 
for a networked RFID system. Therefore when 
developing a security framework specifically for 
networked RFID systems these differences must 
be taken into consideration. Currently no security 
framework has been developed for networked 
RFID systems. But there exists a number of ge-
neric security and network security frameworks 
as well as some classifications of RFID attacks 
and defences that present some interesting insights 
in to this research area. In the following section 
we will examine some of those papers and anal-
yse their weakness in context of the security of 
networked RFID systems.
In Ayoade (2007) the authors present a ‘Road-
map to solving security and privacy concerns in 
RFID systems.’ This paper identifies some of the 
potential threats and attacks possible on RFID 
systems. It then goes on to present some pro-
posed technical solutions as well as some policy 
propositions that can be used to neutralize the 
identified threats and attacks. Unfortunately the 
security threats identified are in no way compre-
hensive and it fails to mention some of the more 
dangerous threats such as RFID malware or RFID 
cloning. The list of proposed technical solutions 
presented is short and in some cases not viable 
due to practical or performance issues.
In Rotter (2008) the authors present “A frame-
work for assessing RFID System Security and 
Privacy Risks.’ The work presented contains a 
lot of information about the potential security 
and privacy threats faced by a large number of 
different types of RFID systems. Unfortunately it 
makes no mention of some of the threats and issues 
specific to networked RFID systems with multiple 
partners. This paper also contains no information 
about the security functionality required to defend 
against the identified threats. While the framework 
is suitable for standalone RFID systems it’s too 
simple for networked RFID systems.
‘Framework for ensuring network security’ 
(McGee, et al., 2004) has been built around a 
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threat model using a modified version of the 
C.I.A threat model. It uses a layering technique 
to ensure that all areas of the system’s security 
have been covered whether it’s at hardware level 
or at application level. It also contains a list of 
the security requirements to secure an IT network 
and a number of cross analysis tables mapping 
the security requirement, the threat model and the 
different layers of the network to identify what 
needs to be done at each layer to negate each threat 
identified in the threat model. It also compares the 
developed framework with some other popular 
security frameworks. The biggest issue with this 
framework is that’s it’s developed for typical net-
work systems and not networked RFID systems. 
Therefore this framework overlooks some threats 
specific to networked Multi-entity RFID systems 
as well as some threats that all RFID systems face. 
Also some of the preventive measures discussed 
are not possible in a RFID system due to the dif-
ferences in its architecture compared to a normal 
wired IT network.
The ‘Integrated security framework’ presented 
in (Jeong & Haas, 2007) is also of the same nature 
but even more generic framework than the one 
presented in Rotter (2008). This framework has 
been developed to apply to all types of wirelesses 
networks ranging from complex and high pow-
ered cellular networks to basic RFID networks 
employing low cost RFID tags. While the authors 
discuss the basic security concepts that apply to all 
wireless systems (Confidentiality, Authentication, 
Integrity, Availability and Non-repudiation) it does 
not mention any of the RFID specific attacks such 
as data leakage, cloning or tag tracking.
‘Classification of RFID attacks’ (Mitrokotsa, 
et al., 2010) classifies a majority of the currently 
possible attacks on RFID systems based on the 
layer at which the attack is targeted at. The tax-
onomy contains all the common RFID threats 
such as replay attacks, impersonation attacks and 
denial of service attacks. It also discusses some 
of the lesser known attacks such as malicious 
code injection and traffic analysis. While this 
classification is helpful in securing a majority of 
RFID systems it still does not look at some of the 
threats uniquely present in networked multi-entity 
RFID systems such as repudiation, unauthorized 
data modification by partners and corporate data 
theft. It is also taxonomy rather than a security 
framework and therefore focuses more on identify-
ing and classifying threats rather than identifying 
how to secure the system against them.
THREAT MODEL FOR 
NETWORKED RFID
The distributed and collaborative nature of net-
worked RFID along with the use of low cost RFID 
tags which employ wireless communications mean 
that there are a large number of threats faced by 
these types of systems. These threats exploit vul-
nerabilities in the system to become attacks. The 
threat model we develop and present in this section 
will identify and discuss the common threats faced 
by networked RFID systems. It will then analyse 
how those threats exploit certain vulnerabilities 
that can exist in the system to become specific 
attacks that that compromise the security of the 
system (see Figure 2).
Figure 2. Threat model for networked RFID
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The two most common threats faced by RFID 
systems are the possibility of an attacker intercept-
ing or changing the wireless communications 
between tags and readers. Because low cost RFID 
tags do not contain sufficient resources for standard 
security functionality most networked RFID 
systems cannot implement strong authentication, 
confidentiality or integrity verification. Therefore 
potential attackers can exploit the lack of these 
security mechanisms to mount a number of attacks 
on the system. These attacks allow them to either 
gain access to confidential information or allow 
them to exchange sensitive data so as to harm the 
system. In eavesdropping the attacker exploits 
the lack of confidentially in the system to listen 
to a legitimate conversation between readers and 
tags. This allows the attacker to gain access to 
confidential information. Data leakage attacks: a 
more complex form of eavesdropping, are 
mounted by eavesdropping on a large number of 
authenticated communications between a tag and 
a reader and using that data to gain confidential 
information (Mitrokotsa, et al., 2010). Another 
common attack which exploits lack of proper 
mutual authentication in RFID communications 
is the man-in-the-middle attack. This attack is a 
form of active eavesdropping in which the at-
tacker makes independent connections with a 
reader and tag that is communicating while mak-
ing them believe that they are talking directly to 
each other. The attacker then proceeds to change 
valuable data or steal confidential information as 
it’s transmitted through him between the reader 
and the tags (Rotter, 2008). Lack of strong mu-
tual authentication is also exploited to mount 
replay attacks. Here the attacker uses previously 
used responses by a tag or a reader in a challenge-
response protocol to initiate a new session with 
the tags or readers of the system. This allows the 
attacker to access either the reader or tags as a 
legitimate component and steal information or 
wrongly update data stored on the system. Attack-
ers can also exploit the weak encryption techniques 
used in RFID systems using low cost tags to mount 
crypto attacks on those systems. Crypto attacks 
use various mathematical methods to break 
through the weak encryption in communications 
and gain access to the information that’s being 
communicated.
Another major threat faced by networked RFID 
systems is the attacker introducing false objects 
into the system. These types of threats primarily 
exploit the lack of proper mutual authenticate 
between tags and readers. Tag cloning, tag spoof-
ing and reader impersonation are all attacks that 
result from this type of threat being successfully 
leveraged into an attack. In tag cloning the at-
tacker replicates all the identification details of a 
legitimate tag on to a forged tag and introduces 
it in to the system. In tag spoofing, rather than 
creating a new tag, the attacker just transmits the 
identification information of legitimate tags in the 
vicinity of readers using a transmitting device. In 
reader impersonation the attacker impersonates a 
reader of the system, rather than a tag, and tries 
to access tags by initiating a conversation with 
them (Rotter, 2008). All three of these attacks 
enable the attacker to either feed false data to 
the system or retrieve confidential data from the 
backend database while posing as a legitimate 
component of the system.
The threat of RFID malware has only been re-
cently brought to the attention of RFID researchers 
(Rieback, et al., 2006). These attacks are mounted 
by exploiting poor mutual authentication or storage 
integrity checks to store malicious code on the tags 
or to create cloned tags with malicious data and 
introduce them into the system. When these tags 
are read by readers the malware either corrupts the 
data in the backend databases or compromises the 
middleware of the system by infecting it. In buf-
fer overflow attacks, which are a simpler version 
of malware attacks, the attacker makes a tag try 
and send the same block of data repeatedly till it 
overflows a memory buffer in either the readers or 
the middleware of the system thereby corrupting 
data or even crashing that component or even the 
whole system (Rieback, et al., 2006). The threat 
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of RFID malware is very severe because it not 
only corrupts data but it can also spread from tag 
to system to tag and affect a very large amount 
of tags and back end databases very quickly. 
More complex RFID malware can even infect 
the business applications or open breaches in the 
firewalls protecting the internal system allowing 
attackers access the internal components of the 
system directly.
Another type of threat to networked RFID 
systems is the invasion of privacy enabled by 
tracking tags. Here the attacker sets up a network 
of RFID readers and exploits the mobility of the 
tags and the fact that most tags reply with their 
unique identification number on being queried 
by any reader. By identifying the tag at regu-
lar intervals they can then build a map of their 
movement over time thereby tracking either the 
person or the object the tag is attached to (Weis, 
et al., 2003). Tag constellation tracking is a more 
complex form of tag tracking where the attacker 
tracks a combination of tags rather than a single tag 
(Mitrokotsa, et al., 2010). Additionally most radio 
transmitting devices have what is known as a radio 
fingerprint which is created at manufacture and 
is unique to each tag. By exploiting this attackers 
can sometimes track individual tags even if they 
don’t have access to its identification number.
Another threat faced by RFID systems is the 
attacker rendering components or even the whole 
system unavailable my various means. The suc-
cessful completion of such an attack can cause part 
of or even the whole system to become unavail-
able. This in turn affects the performance of not 
only the RFID system but also that of the business 
applications of both the company in question and 
external partners that rely on the RFID system for 
information. The easiest Denial of Service (DOS) 
attacks to mount on RFID systems are signal 
jamming and physical destruction of system com-
ponents. Signal jamming takes advantage of the 
fact that wireless communications use a broadcast 
medium and floods the channel with powerful 
signals using the same frequency. This makes it 
impossible for the relatively weak RFID signals 
to propagate through thereby effectively render-
ing the tags unavailable to be read by the readers 
(Rotter, 2008). The attacker can also exploit limited 
amount of resources available on readers and tags 
and bombard a specific reader or tag of the system 
with data requests thereby overloading that tags 
or the reader’s capability to reply (Mitrokotsa, et 
al., 2010). Attackers can also exploit the relatively 
lower physical security available to RFID tags to 
just physically damage or destroy the tag thereby 
shutting down the system. A more complex DOS 
threat that can be mounted on some RFID systems 
is the de-synchronization of tags with the backend 
components. Here the attacker takes advantage 
of the temporary pseudonyms used by certain 
RFID protocols to de-synchronize the tags next 
response from the response expected by the rest 
of the system. This makes it impossible for the tag 
and reader to communicate till they are manual 
re- synched (Li and Deng, 2007). Attackers can 
also exploit the built in KILL or LOCK commands 
on certain RFID tags to disable those RFID tags 
thereby rendering them useless till they are reac-
tivated (Juels, 2006).
In RFID systems with multiple partners the 
possibility of a partner compromising the overall 
system for his own profit is an ever-present threat. 
The possibility of attacks by partners jeopardizes 
the trust the users have in the system thereby reduc-
ing the overall advantages that can be gained by 
implementing a networked RFID system. Here the 
partners take advantage of either there authorized 
access to the system or the lack of proper access 
controls to mount attacks which compromise 
the system for other users. Repudiation attacks 
happen when an entity sends a communication 
or changes system data but later denies doing so 
(Fernando & Abawajy, 2009). In RFID this can 
be in the form of changed tag data to forged tag 
broadcasts. Another threat in this environment is 
partner de-synchronization. This attack is a car-
ried out by an authorized independent partner of 
the system and would typically de-synchronize 
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the RFID tag with the backend databases and 
readers of the other partners in the network. In a 
multi entity RFID network some companies may 
want to use the RFID tags to store data that is 
confidential or the capabilities of some companies 
may be limited (e.g., can read tag data but cannot 
update it or can read just some of the tag data and 
not all of it). By exploiting the lack of proper 
access controls a partner can mount an elevation 
of privileges attack and increase the access he 
has to the tags of the system to gain confidential 
information on the partners business processes 
and intents or to even update or delete RFID data 
without proper authorization (Mitrokotsa, et al., 
2010) (see Table 1).
Table 1. Networked RFID threat model 
Threat Exploits weaknesses: And results in
Interception or modi-
fication of system data 
and communications
Lack of secure mutual authentication Replay attacks
Lack of secure mutual authentication and confidentiality Eavesdropping attacks 
Data leakage
Lack of secure mutual authentication, integrity verification 
and confidentiality
Man-in-the- middle,
Lack of sufficiently strong encryption Crypto attacks,
Lack of storage confidentiality 
Poor physical security of tags
Physical reading of tags
Lack of storage integrity 
Poor physical security of tags
Physical writing to tags
Introduction of false 
objects into system
Lack of strong and secure mutual authentication Tag cloning 
Tag spoofing 
Reader masquerading
Invasion of privacy Mobility of tags 
lack of proper mutual authentication
Tracking (Forward and Backward) 
Tag constellation tracking
The mobility of the tags and the easily identifiable radio 
fingerprint on low cost tags
Radio fingerprint tracking
Denial of service Lack of physical security Physical destruction of components
Low resources available on tags Active jamming
Broadcast mechanism of communications Passive jamming,
Use of pseudonyms of some security protocols De-synchronization of tags
Built in lock and kill commands and lack of mutual authen-
tication
Unauthorised tag locking or killing
RFID malware Lack of strong and secure mutual authentication lack of 
storage integrity. 
Weak anti- malware protection on backend servers
RFID malware (worms, viruses, SQL and 
Script injection)
Lack of strong and secure mutual authentication Lack of 
proper buffer control in readers
Buffer overflow
Attacks by internal 
partners
Lack of access control Elevation of privileges (reading)
Lack of data ownership Elevation of privileges (writing)
Lack of non-repudiation Repudiation of actions
Lack of access controls 
Lack of non-repudiation
Partner de-synch, killing or locking tags for 
partners
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SECURITY FRAMEWORK
When developing a security framework for any 
system there are two main areas that have to be 
explored and analysed: (1) the possible attacks to 
the system and their features and (2) the important 
system components that must be protected. There-
fore our security framework is composed of two 
main parts: the attack model and the system model.
Attack Model
The attack model analyses the possible attacks on 
the system and classifies them based on various 
different criteria. The attack model allows readers 
to get a better understanding of all the attacks that 
can possibly be mounted on a networked RFID 
system. The attack model analyses the attacks in 
three ways. It looks at the source of the attack, 
the negative impact the attack will have on the 
system if successful and the method by which the 
attack access the system components it’s attacking 
(see Figure 3).
Access Methods
One of the most important aspects of any attack 
is how that attack is actually mounted on the 
system. For networked RFID applications we 
identify two main access methods with which 
attackers can attack the system: logical access 
and physical access.
The main method of communication between 
tags and readers in a RFID system is wireless 
communication. Therefore potential attackers 
can exploit this communication method to gain 
logical access to either the memory modules of 
the system or even the information that is being 
remotely communicated between the tags and 
readers. Unauthorized logical access to the sys-
tem can be gained in a number of different ways 
(Mitrokotsa, et al., 2010). The attacker can pretend 
to be an authorized tag or reader and gain access 
to the system. They can also try and intercept the 
wireless transmissions between the readers and 
tags and decrypt them to gain the information 
stored in them. Eavesdropping, tag tracking and 
replay attacks are some common types of logical 
access attacks.
In normal IT systems the data is stored in a 
physically secure location such as a data server in 
a server room. Whereas RFID systems store some 
of its sensitive data on the RFID tag itself, which 
is in turn affixed to physical objects that travel 
along the physical network (Tajima, 2007). IN 
addition the RFID readers may also be mounted in 
relatively unsecure locations such as warehouses 
and transport vehicles. Therefore some of the 
components in networked RFID systems have 
relatively low physical security compared to the 
components of a normal network. Physical access 
Figure 3. Attack model for networked RFID
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attacks are mounted by attackers who gain physi-
cal access to the tags or the readers of the system. 
Physical destruction of tags and physical reading 
and writing of tags are some common physical 
access attacks. (See Table 4 for details of access 
methods of all identified attacks)
Attack Impact
Another important aspect of any attack is the 
impact it will have on the system. We categorize 
the attacks possible on networked RFID systems 
into 5 main groups based on the negative impact 
they will have on the system: (1) Modification, 
(2) Interception, (3) Interruption, (4) Fabrication 
and (5) Tracking. The impacts we have identified 
are slightly different from the STRIDE developed 
my Microsoft. Table 2 maps our impacts to the 
STRIDE model for comparison.
Interception and modification attacks are the 
most common attacks possible on any IT system. 
In interception attacks the attacker intercepts data 
while it’s stored or being communicated and gains 
access to confidential information. In modification 
attacks the attacker changes, deletes or creates 
data in the system without authorization (Fer-
nando & Abawajy, 2009). In RFID systems these 
attacks can be carried out with either remote or 
physical access. The wireless nature of RFID 
means communications can be easily intercepted 
as they are travelling between tags and readers 
allowing for remote modification and interception. 
The storage of sensitive data on a mobile RFID 
tags means the system can also be subject to 
modification and interception attacks via physical 
access to the tags (Fernando & Abawajy, 2009). 
Replay-attacks, man-in-the-middle attacks, eaves-
dropping, data leakage and crypto attacks are all 
common interception attacks on RFID systems. 
Modification attacks while harder to mount also 
have a much greater impact on the system if they 
are successful. If a modification attack is success-
ful then critical data that’s not available elsewhere 
may be lost or corrupted in the process. If the 
system is to continue working there must be a 
way in which the system can identify and re-
cover from these attacks. Successful modification 
attacks mounted via replay attacks or man in the 
middle attacks can be further leveraged to car-
ryout RFID malware or buffer overflow attacks 
(Rieback, et al., 2006). Data integrity of the tag 
can also be compromised by natural causes such 
as electromagnetic fields and physical shocks 
(Fernando & Abawajy, 2009) (see Table 3).
Ensuring the availability of any IT system is 
of paramount importance. An interruption attack 
renders the system unusable by blocking access 
to some or all parts of the system or by ensuring 
that different parts of the system can’t properly 
identify or communicate with each other (Fer-
nando and Abawajy, 2009). The availability of 
RFID systems are of vital importance to corpora-
tions using them as unavailability of the RFID 
systems leads to the unavailability of all the ap-
plications that rely on it. In RFID systems inter-
ruption attacks can vary from simple active radio 
jamming attacks to complex attacks that desyn-
Table 2. Mapping of attack classification to Microsoft STRIDE model 
Spoofing Tampering Repudiation Information 
Disclosure
Denial of 
Service
Elevation of 
Privilege
Modification Y Y Y
Interception Y Y
Interruption Y Y
Fabrication Y Y Y
Tracking Y Y
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chronize tags with the central database in RFID 
systems using pseudonyms (Karygicmnis, et al., 
2006). The availability of RFID systems can also 
be compromised by physical or logical destruction 
of tags or their data and the use on unauthorized 
kill/lock attacks to stop the functionality of the 
tags.
In addition to the above common types of 
attacks RFID systems are subject to two more 
types of attacks: fabrication attacks and tracking 
attacks. Fabrication happens when the attacker 
inserts new messages or items into the system 
without the knowledge or authorization of the 
system owners (Pfleeger, 1997). In RFID systems 
these attacks mainly manifest as cloning or spoof-
ing attacks where the attacker inserts fabricated 
tags into the system. The attacker may also try 
to carry out a fabrication attack by pretending 
to be an authorized reader and querying tags for 
their information as well. Like with modifica-
tion attacks successful fabrication attacks can 
be further leveraged to mount malware attacks 
on the system or in some cases cloned tags can 
be used to authenticate false object as their real 
Table 3. Attacks by their possible impact on system 
Modification Interception Interruption Fabrication Tracking
Replay attacks Y Y
Eavesdropping attacks Y
Data leakage Y
Man-in-the- middle, Y Y
Crypto attacks Y
Physical reading of tags Y
Physical writing to tags Y
Tag cloning Y Y Y Y
Tag spoofing Y Y Y Y
Reader masquerading Y Y Y Y Y
Tracking (Forward and Backward) Y
Tag constellation tracking Y
Radio fingerprint tracking Y
Physical destruction of components Y
Active jamming Y
Passive jamming, Y
De-synchronization of tags Y Y
Unauthorised tag locking or killing Y
RFID Malware (worms, viruses, SQL and Script injec-
tion)
Y Y Y
Buffer overflow Y Y
Elevation of privileges (reading) Y
Elevation of privileges (writing) Y
Repudiation of actions Y
Partner de-synch, Y
Killing or locking tags for partners Y
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counterparts (medicines and other designer con-
sumer goods). Tracking attacks are possible on 
networked RFID systems due to the mobile nature 
of the tags. By tracking the movement of individual 
tags along the physical network the attacker can 
gain insight into the structure of the network as 
well other information such as location of specific 
vehicles or people and the efficiency of physical 
network and the business processes that support 
it. Tracking can also carried out my physically or 
logically compromising a tag and then using the 
information gained to identify the past or future 
transmissions of that tag (forward tracking and 
backward tracking) (Mitrokotsa, et al., 2010).
Source of Attack
Another important part of any attack is the source 
of that attack. In networked RFID systems, unlike 
in standalone RFID systems, the attack can origi-
nate from one of two different sources: External 
attackers and internal attackers (see Table 4).
External attackers are persons or organiza-
tions that have no authorized access to the system 
Table 4. Attacks by access method and attack source 
Access Method Attack Source
Logical Physical External Internal
Replay attacks Y Y
Eavesdropping attacks Y Y
Data leakage Y Y
Man-in-the- middle, Y Y
Crypto attacks Y Y Y
Physical reading of tags Y Y
Physical writing to tags Y Y
Tag cloning Y Y
Tag spoofing Y Y
Reader masquerading Y Y
Tracking (Forward and Backward) Y Y
Tag constellation tracking Y Y
Radio fingerprint tracking Y Y
Physical destruction of components Y Y
Active jamming Y Y
Passive jamming, Y Y
De-synchronization of tags Y Y Y
Unauthorised tag locking or killing Y Y Y
RFID Malware (worms, viruses, SQL injection) Y Y Y
Buffer overflow Y Y Y
Elevation of privileges (reading) Y Y Y
Elevation of privileges (writing) Y Y Y
Repudiation of actions Y Y Y
Partner de-synch Y Y Y
killing or locking tags for partners Y
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but try and gain some or complete access to the 
system by various means. These attackers have a 
number of motivations for these attacks including 
stealing restricted information, changing system 
data, stealing the goods the tags are affixed to, 
tracking the tags as they travel long the physical 
network, cloning the RFID tags for counterfeit-
ing and spreading malicious malware into the 
system thereby disrupting its performance (Rotter, 
2008). Internal attackers on the other hand are 
authorized users of the system who try and gain 
more access than they are entitled to (a partner 
who is only allowed to read tag data updates it) 
or try to disrupt the system in such a way as to 
harm other users of the system. Because networked 
RFID systems are typically used by a number 
of independent entities who are simultaneously 
partners and competitors, internal attacks are a 
major concern for these types of systems (Li & 
Visich, 2006). There are a number of attacks that 
internal attackers can carry out on networked 
RFID systems including creating data/ updating 
tags and then denying they made those changes 
(repudiation) and gaining access to private data 
stored on the tags by other partners in the supply 
chain (Elevation of privileges [reading]) as well 
as changing data they are not authorized to change 
(Elevation of privileges [writing]).
System Model
In the previous section we discussed the attack 
model component of the security framework. In 
this section we will discuss the system model 
component of the security framework. The system 
model identifies the key system components that 
need to be protected and analyses the security 
concepts that must be preserved to fully secure the 
system and the security requirements that result.
System Components
In a networked RFID system the system compo-
nents include RFID tags, RFID communications, 
readers, middleware, and backend data storage 
and business applications. In RFID systems the 
edge components: namely the readers and tags 
are implemented on non-standard devices and 
they communicate using a non-secure channel. 
The other components on the other hand are 
all implemented and connected by standard IT 
infrastructure. Therefore in our framework we 
separate the components into three groups: The 
tags, the wireless communications and the back-
end components (see Figure 4).
Tags in standard large scale networked RFID 
applications typically comprise of an electronic 
memory module, a logic module and a commu-
nication antenna. The memory module of the tag 
can consist of memory which can be read only, 
write once or updatable. The logic module of low 
cost RFID tags consists of between 500 to 10000 
gates. The tags can be powered with either passive 
a semi-passive power source or an active power 
source (Hassan & Chatterjee, 2006). In any RFID 
systems the tags hold the identifier of the object 
it’s attached to as well as additional data such as 
brand, product, expiry date and price of the object 
it’s attached to. Unlike other IT components RFID 
tags are extremely mobile and have very low 
physical security.
Wireless communications are how tags and 
readers of a networked RFID system communicate. 
The wireless signals are communicated via an in-
secure channel and is transmitted using a broadcast 
mechanism. The range of a RFID transmission 
depends on the frequency of the radio wave used 
and the power applied. One of the main concerns 
in securing RFID systems is providing adequate 
security to the wireless communications given the 
limited power and computing capabilities avail-
able on low cost tags and the throughput required. 
Currently most RFID communications are secured 
using relatively weak security protocols. These 
protocols normally employ low resource opera-
tions such as bitwise XOR and one way hashing 
to try and secure the communications.
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The backend components compose of the read-
ers, middleware, RFID repository and business 
applications. RFID readers are used to read and 
write data to and from RFID tags. RFID readers 
do not normally store any data or translate any 
data. They just act as a messenger between the 
RFID middleware and the RFID tags and relay raw 
binary information from the middleware to the tags 
and vice versa. The middleware filters, translates 
and formats the data to the RFID repository that 
then stores that data from future retrieval from 
either the middleware or by business applications 
(Tajima, 2007).
Security Concepts
Security concepts are core requirements that must 
be met to ensure the security of any given appli-
cation. The security concepts for an application 
depend on the system architecture and its func-
tionality. In networked RFID systems we identify 
five key security concepts that must be met to 
ensure the security of the system: authenticity, 
integrity, confidentiality, privacy and availability 
(see Figure 5).
Authenticity ensures the validity of the claimed 
identities of the components participating in a 
communication. It ensures that no entity is actu-
ally trying to masquerade as someone or something 
they are not (McGee, et al., 2004). In networked 
RFID this means that all readers must be able to 
identify each tag as being who it claims to be and 
that all tags can identify each reader as being part 
of the system.
Integrity ensures the correctness and accuracy 
of data, whether its stored data or data being com-
municated, against unauthorized creation, modifi-
cation and deletion. It also provides an indication 
if the data has been compromised in this manner 
and in some cases allows for the retrieval of the 
correct data from the corrupted version (McGee, 
et al., 2004). For networked RFID this requires 
Figure 4. Components of networked RFID Figure 5. Applying the security concepts to the 
components
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the integrity of the data stored on the RFID tag 
and the backend database as well as the data that’s 
being communicated between readers and tags. 
Complete implementation of integrity also ensures 
that once data has been created, modified or deleted 
by an authorized party those changes cannot be 
denied by that party. Confidentiality protects the 
data of the system from unauthorized disclosure to 
parties who are not entitled to access that data. In 
networked RFID systems confidentiality requires 
that both the data stored on the tag itself and the 
data that is being communicated between readers 
and tags is secure from unauthorized access by 
outside parties. It also requires that the authorized 
partners do not gain access to data that they are 
not allowed to access.
In addition to the above mentioned require-
ments, full security of a RFID system requires 
that the concepts of privacy and availability be 
assured. Privacy provides for the protection of 
information that might be derived from observ-
ing system activities (Rotter, 2008). In networked 
RFID systems this protects against attacks such 
as tracking of tag movements and the use of traf-
fic analysis to derive information about the data 
that’s being communicated. The final security 
concept, availability ensures that that there is no 
denial of access or service by any component of 
the system to other authorized parties or compo-
nents of the system (McGee, et al., 2004). For 
networked RFID applications this requires that 
all readers can access all the tags of the system 
and vice versa. It also requires that the overall 
RFID system be available when other business 
applications require data from it.
For a networked RFID system to be fully 
secured all of the above mentioned security 
concepts must be fully assured for each group 
of components in the system. Therefore the five 
core security concepts of authenticity, integrity, 
confidentiality, privacy and availability must be 
separately assured for the tags, communications 
and backend components of the RFID system.
Networked RFID Security 
Requirements
The security requirements are the security func-
tionality that needs to be implemented to secure the 
system. As explained above, each security concept 
for each component must be separately secured 
before the overall system can be considered secure. 
Therefore we identify that the all following secu-
rity requirements must be implemented to ensure 
that all the security concepts for each component 
is fully secured (see Table 5).
Mutual authentication allows the two com-
municating entities to verify the identity of the 
entity they will be communicating with (Pfleeger, 
1997). In RFID systems mutual authentication is 
required to ensure that the readers and tags that 
are communicating are of the same network and 
Table 5. Networked RFID security requirements 
Integrity Authenticity Confidentiality Privacy Availability
Tags Mutual Authentica-
tion, 
Storage Integrity, 
Non Repudiation, 
Data Ownership
Mutual Authentica-
tion
Mutual Authentica-
tion, 
Storage Confidenti-
ality, 
Access Control
Anonymity Physical Protec-
tion, 
Electronic 
Protection
Communications Transmission Integ-
rity
Transmission 
Integrity
Transmission Confi-
dentiality
Data Leakage 
Protection
Electronic 
Protection
Backend Components Mutual Authentica-
tion, 
Non Repudiation,
Mutual Authentica-
tion
Mutual Authentica-
tion,
N/A Electronic 
Protection
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have access to that information and are authorized 
to do the data modifications they request. Proper 
mutual authentication not only ensure the authen-
ticity of the components but also provides confi-
dentiality and integrity for the data stored on the 
backend components by ensuring that only au-
thorized entities can access that data. Secure 
mutual authentication is also required as a base 
to implement a majority of the remaining secu-
rity requirements and is therefore the most im-
portant security requirement in networked RFID. 
Most RFID security protocols implement mutual 
authentication as part of its security features. Some 
important protocols that implement mutual au-
thentication are (Chien, 2007; Peris-Lopez, et al., 
2008; Zhang & Baciu, 2008).
Because RFID systems use wireless communi-
cations it is easy for potential attackers to intercept 
them. Transmission confidentially ensures the se-
curity of data while it’s been broadcast by ensuring 
that it cannot be understood by an attacker who 
intercepts it (McGee, et al., 2004). Transmission 
confidentiality typically uses various encryption 
methods to ensure that attackers cannot understand 
data intercepted in this manner. The protocols in 
(Chien, 2007; Peris-Lopez, et al., 2008; Zhang 
& Baciu, 2008) all provide for transmission 
confidentiality. Storage confidentiality ensures 
the security of data while it’s stored on the tag 
or the backend components. In networked RFID 
systems the tag is easily accessible by attackers. 
Hence it is important that tag data be secure in 
case of physical or logical compromise of the 
tag (Fernando & Abawajy, 2009). Unfortunately 
storage confidentially is an area that has received 
very little research attention till now.
Complete data integrity requires the two se-
curity requirements of transmission integrity and 
storage integrity to be implemented. In RFID not 
only can potential attackers intercept wireless 
communications but they can also modify those 
communications compromising there integrity. 
Ensuring that communications that have been il-
legally modified can be identified and the original 
data recovered is done by transmission integrity 
Transmission integrity in RFID typically employ 
various low cost encryption methods and mes-
sage digests/hashes to enable the detection and 
recovery of RFID communications that have been 
externally modified (Mohan, et al., 2006). The 
protocols presented in (Chien, 2007; Peris-Lopez, 
et al., 2008; Zhang & Baciu, 2008) all provide 
communication integrity but not data recovery. 
RFID broadcast data recovery still remains an 
area open for research. Storage integrity ensures 
the integrity of data while it’s stored on the tag. 
The relative physical and logical accessibility 
of RFID tags on which sensitive data is stored 
dictates that storage integrity is a high priority, 
especially in systems which store additional sensi-
tive data on the tag (Fernando & Abawajy, 2009). 
Both encryption methods and journaling systems 
such as the ones presented in (Han & Chao-Hsien, 
2008; Yamamoto, et al., 2008) can be used to 
ensure some storage integrity but currently they 
are not sufficiently strong or compete enough. 
Currently storage integrity of RFID tags is an area 
with very little research contributions. Because 
current applications store a majority of data on 
the backend database rather than the tag this is 
not currently an issue. But in the future as more 
and more systems store data on the tag itself this 
will become a high priority security requirement.
In a multi-entity RFID system some partners 
may like to store data on the tags that is acces-
sible only to them (Fernando & Abawajy, 2009). 
Therefore the security functionality of the system 
must protect that data from unauthorized access by 
internal partners. If other partners gain access to 
private data this can lead to confidentiality issues 
as well as create trust problems among them. The 
security requirement of access control ensures that 
partners can only gain access to data that they are 
authorized to do so. While the confidentiality of 
private partner data is assured by access control 
its integrity is assured by data ownership. Data 
ownership guarantees that entities can only modify 
data that they are authorized do so. Both access 
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control and data ownership requires granular data 
storage based on the network partner who owns it. 
They also require that finely grained controls are 
implemented to ensure that data on the tags can 
only be accessed or modified by partners based 
on a predefined set of access and update rules. If 
done successfully multiple independent partners 
can have read and write access to the RFID tags 
while ensuring that access is limited to the data 
they are actually authorized to access or modify. 
RFID tag access control and data ownership are 
research areas which have very little work done 
in them.
Non repudiation is a security requirement 
that ensures the identification of the origin of 
data and the assurance of the genuineness of that 
data (Pfleeger, 1997). For example a partner, 
who is authorized to do so, may change the price 
stored on the RFID tag then deny doing so. Non-
repudiation ensures that this cannot happen. By 
ensuring that a record of what data is modified by 
which entity is kept, non-repudiation guarantees 
accountability of those partners increasing over-
all trust in the system (Yamamoto, et al., 2008). 
Non-repudiation techniques for backend database 
exist but no non-repudiation techniques have been 
developed for securing the data stored on RFID 
tags (see Figure 6).
In networked RFID systems attackers are able 
to invade the privacy of the tag holder by tracking 
their movement (Juels, 2006). Anonymity ensures 
that tracking attacks cannot be mounted on the 
tag. There are a number of tracking attacks pos-
sible on RFID systems including tag tracking, 
forward and backward tracing, and radio finger-
print tracking as well as tag constellation tracking 
(Juels, 2006). The protocols presented in (Chien, 
2007; Peris-Lopez, et al., 2008; Zhang & Baciu, 
2008) all use a system of pseudonyms to ensure 
the privacy of the tags. This system also provides 
a limited form of protection against forward and 
backward tracking as well. The privacy of RFID 
Figure 6. Networked RFID security framework
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systems can also be compromised by data leakage. 
Data leakage happens when attackers intercept 
communications or other information about the 
system over a long period of time and gradually 
use that data to derive information about the 
system and the data being communicated by it 
(Mitrokotsa, et al., 2010). Common data leakage 
attacks include traffic analysis as well as attacks 
on confidentiality of the system via a large num-
ber of eavesdropping attacks on weakly encrypt-
ed communications. Data leakage protection re-
quires that the attacker is unable to derive any 
information about system data or system security 
over the course of multiple eavesdropping ses-
sions. Data leakage protection can be imple-
mented by using techniques such as implementa-
tion of more advanced hardware configurations 
and ensuring that all communications are strong-
ly encrypted. The protocols presented in (Chien, 
2007; Peris-Lopez, et al., 2008; Zhang & Baciu, 
2008) all claim strong and secure encryption which 
makes data leakage attacks impossible.
Networked RFID systems availability can be 
disrupted through physical or electronic means. 
The security requirements of physical protection 
and electronic protection secure the system against 
these types of attacks. Physical protection will pro-
tect the system against attacks such as physical tag 
destruction, removal of tags from the tagged items 
or the use of items such as aluminium foil to mask 
tag signals. Physical protection is easily provided 
by ensuring that physical access to RFID tags is 
limited to authorized parties when possible and by 
having deterrents such as electronic surveillance 
present when unauthorized parties can access the 
tagged items. Electronic protection is required to 
protect the system from denial of service attacks 
mounted through electronic means. These attacks 
include overwriting/destroying tag data through 
strong electronic magnetic pulses, disruption of 
communications through radio frequency jam-
ming, overloading of the system capability with 
repeated requests or by de-synching the tags with 
the authorized readers through message blocking. 
To combat these types of threats, functionality 
such as filtering of tags or readers which repeat-
edly send the same request and multiple frequency 
transmissions can be implemented. Also the use 
of RFID tags that can simultaneously transmit in 
several different wireless frequencies or move 
between a few preset frequencies can make pas-
sive jamming attacks much more difficult.
APPLICATION OF THE FRAMEWORK
In this section we will evaluate the developed 
framework by applying it to a real world networked 
RFID application. We will demonstrate that our 
framework allows for the methodical identifica-
tion of the threats faced by the system in question 
and that it also allows the user to easily identify 
all the possible attacks on the system and analyse 
their impact, point of origin and access method. 
We will also demonstrate how the framework 
makes identifying the security requirements that 
need to be implemented to protect against those 
threats easy.
RFID in E-Passports
An area in which the use of networked RFID is 
rapidly becoming more common is the use of RFID 
tags in passports. Many countries—including the 
USA, Australia and all European Union mem-
bers—recently introduced e-passports containing 
RFID chips. The tags are normally embedded in 
the photo page of the passport and also contain 
all the information displayed on the photo page. 
When interrogated by authorized readers, the 
tags transmit personal and biometric data of the 
holder to the reader. For example the Australian 
e-passports contain all the data that’s displayed on 
the photo page of the passport: namely the digitized 
photograph, name, gender, date of birth, national-
ity, passport number, and the passport expiry date. 
The stored information is only broadcast when an 
authorized reader requests for that information, 
106
A Security Framework for Networked RFID
requests by unknown readers are ignored. One 
key feature of this system is that a majority of 
the static data of the object is stored on the tag 
itself and not on a back end database. Because 
the data stored on the RFID tag is unchanging the 
readers and tags are typically only read enabled 
and that data cannot be updated. In addition data 
is communicated in one way with no data being 
broadcast from the reader to the tag other than its 
authentication info. The main differences between 
the RFID tags used in RFID enabled passports and 
other common RFID applications such as patient 
tracking and global supply chains is that the tags 
used are typically a lot more expensive. Because 
personal and biometric data are particularly 
sensitive, attackers might be highly motivated 
to copy e-passports or use their data for identity 
theft. The consequences of an attack could be seri-
ous, including personal and biometric data theft, 
tracking of the e-passport’s owner, illegal border 
crossings or even detonating a bomb designed 
for a specific country of origin or for a specific 
individual, based on information emitted by the 
chip in his or her passport (McGee, et al., 2004).
Applying the Threat Model to Scenario
Now let’s consider the threat model for this type 
of system: Out of the 6 types of threats possible 
on networked RFID systems only 4 of are of 
concern to this particular system. The threats (1) 
interception and modification of system data and 
communications (2) introduction of false objects 
into system (3) invasion of privacy and (4) denial 
of service still remain. But the threat of (5) RFID 
malware and (6) attacks by internal partners can 
be disregarded. The threat of RFID malware can 
be disregarded because these systems use read-
only RFID tags which make storing malware on 
them impossible. Even if an attacker managed to 
use a cloned or spoofed RFID tag to feed malware 
to a reader it would only affect that reader and 
terminal and would not be further propagated to 
other systems or tags as the tags used in the system 
are not updatable. Therefore the use of malware 
would become data integrity and authentication 
issue rather than a malware problem. The threat 
posed by internal partners can be disregarded for 
a number of reasons. All authorized partners are 
allowed to read all the data stored on the system 
and none of the partners can update the data stored 
on the tag making non repudiation and elevation 
of privileges impossible. In addition only reliable 
and trustworthy government law enforcement 
agencies are authorized to read the tags removing 
any trust issues between the partners. Therefore 
by applying the threat model to the system in 
question we can determine the threats, exploits 
and the attacks of the system (see Table 6).
Understanding the Attacks on the 
System
Now that we have identified all possible attacks 
on the system it’s time to understand how those 
attacks can affect this particular system. This is 
done by applying the attack model tables to the 
attacks that can affect this particular system. To 
do this we first disregard any attacks that were 
eliminated when we analysed the threats to the 
system. Then we look at the remaining attacks 
and identify which of their possible impacts are 
applicable for the system in question (see Table 7).
In Table 7 the Ys represent impacts that can 
affect the system. An impact that cannot affect 
the system in question has been removed (e.g., 
possibility of data modification from attacks 
other than man-in-the-middle can be disregarded 
for this system as tags data cannot be updated). 
The final row of the table shows the total number 
of attacks that have each type of impact on the 
system.
By comparing the possible attacks on the sys-
tem to Table 4 we identify the number of attacks 
that use each access method and the number of at-
tacks that originate from each source (see Table 8).
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Identifying Security Requirements and 
Solutions
Finally we will use the system model of the secu-
rity framework to identify the required security 
requirements and the possible methods with which 
to implement them based the systems architecture 
and use. As can be seen in Table 9, a number of 
the identified security requirements for networked 
RFID systems is not required for this system due 
to some of its features.
Next we decide how each of the security re-
quirements identified above can be implemented 
for the system under review taking into consid-
eration the system architecture and the attacks 
that the system is vulnerable to. Therefore we first 
look at the system architecture and identify any 
important and unique features of the system that 
may affect how the security requirements may be 
implemented. In this system we notice a few 
important features: (1) the tags are only con-
tacted by authorized readers at very specific points 
(airport immigration areas) and the owner of the 
tag is well aware of these areas. (2) The tags need 
only contain static non changing data (3) the data 
flow in the system is only from tags to readers 
and (4) the tags are imbedded in expensive pass-
ports and therefore can be high cost tags with 
more resources available on them. Based on the 
vulnerabilities and the identified features of the 
application the following steps can be taken to 
implement the security requirements (see Table 
10).
The analysis done using the framework sug-
gests that non electronic methods may allow for 
a much greater increaser to security at a lower 
price. The use of a simple sleeve to ensure that 
the tag cannot communicate will easily eliminate 
Table 6. Threats, weaknesses, and attacks applicable to e-passport systems 
Threat Exploits weaknesses: And results in
Interception or modifi-
cation system data and 
communications
Lack of secure mutual authentication Replay attacks
Lack of secure mutual authentication and confidentiality Eavesdropping attacks 
Data leakage
Lack of secure mutual authentication, integrity verification 
and confidentiality
Man-in-the- middle,
Lack of sufficiently strong encryption Crypto attacks,
Lack of storage confidentiality 
Poor physical security of tags
Physical reading of tags
Lack of storage integrity 
Poor physical security of tags
Physical writing to tags
Introduction of false 
objects into system
Lack of strong and secure mutual authentication Tag cloning 
Tag spoofing 
Reader masquerading
Invasion of privacy Mobility of tags 
lack of proper mutual authentication
Tracking (Forward and Backward) 
Tag constellation tracking
The mobility of the tags and the easily identifiable radio 
fingerprint on low cost tags
Radio fingerprint tracking
Denial of service Lack of physical security Physical destruction of components
Low resources available on tags Active jamming
Broadcast mechanism of communications Passive jamming,
Use of pseudonyms of some security protocols De-synchronization of tags
Built in lock and kill commands Unauthorised tag locking or killing
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most tracking, reader impersonation and replay 
attacks. The use of tags with very short transmis-
sion ranges will make attacks such as eavesdrop-
ping, man-in-the-middle and replay much more 
difficult. The more expensive nature of the tags 
employed allow for the use of more traditional 
and power security primitives such as tag side 
PRNG and encryption algorithms that make the 
implementation of secure and strong mutual au-
thentication and transmission confidentiality and 
integrity relatively straightforward. The use of 
write only tags will ensure storage integrity and 
storing the data on the tag in encrypted form will 
ensure storage confidentiality.
FUTURE RESEARCH
During the research conducted for this paper we 
identified a number of key areas in RFID security 
which can benefit from future research. One of 
these areas is in actually implementing some of the 
security requirements identified in this framework. 
Out of the security requirements identified in this 
framework a large number already has significant 
Table 7. Impact that the attacks can have on system in question 
Modification Interception Interruption Fabrication Tracking
Replay attacks Y
Eavesdropping 
attacks
Y
Data leakage Y
Man-in-the- middle, Y Y
Crypto attacks Y
Physical reading of 
tags
Y
Physical writing to 
tags
Tag cloning Y Y
Tag spoofing Y Y
Reader masquerad-
ing
Y Y Y
Tracking (Forward 
and Backward)
Y
Tag constellation 
tracking
Radio fingerprint 
tracking
Y
Physical destruction 
of components
Y
Active jamming Y
Passive jamming, Y
De-synchronization 
of tags
Y
Unauthorised tag 
locking or killing
Y
1 9 5 3 3
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Table 8. Access methods and attack sources of attacks on system 
Access Method Attack Source
Logical Physical External Internal
Replay attacks Y Y
Eavesdropping attacks Y Y
Data leakage Y Y
Man-in-the- middle, Y Y
Crypto attacks Y Y Y
Physical reading of tags Y Y
Physical writing to tags
Tag cloning Y Y
Tag spoofing Y Y
Reader masquerading Y Y
Tracking (Forward and 
Backward)
Y Y
Tag constellation tracking
Radio fingerprint tracking Y Y
Physical destruction of 
components
Y Y
Active jamming Y Y
Passive jamming, Y Y
De-synchronization of 
tags
Y Y Y
Unauthorised tag locking 
or killing
Y Y Y
14 5 16 0
Table 9. E-passport security requirements 
Integrity Authenticity Confidentiality Privacy Availability
Tags N/A – Tag data can-
not be modified in a 
meaningful manner
Mutual Authentica-
tion
Mutual Authentication, 
Storage Confidential-
ity, 
Access Control (not 
required as all part-
ners have access to all 
data)
Anonymity Physical Protec-
tion, 
Electronic 
Protection
Communications Transmission 
Integrity
Transmission 
Integrity
Transmission Confi-
dentiality
Data leakage 
protection
Electronic 
Protection
Backend Components Mutual Authentica-
tion
Mutual Authentica-
tion
N/A – Backend data 
is not transmitted to 
the tags and therefore 
cannot be requested by 
attackers
N/A Electronic 
Protection
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work done in their area. There are a large number 
of publications that implement the security re-
quirements of mutual authentication, transmission 
integrity and confidentiality, anonymity and data 
leakage protection. But the amount of research 
done concerning non repudiation, access control 
and storage confidentiality and integrity for net-
worked RFID systems is very little. Therefore 
continued research in implementing these key 
security requirements is of high priority and we 
recommend that researchers focus their efforts 
on these areas. In addition the development of 
a security protocol that allows for the transmis-
sion of tag data other than the EPC and associ-
ated identifiers is a major research priority that 
has not been fulfilled. In the future as more and 
more networked RFID systems store additional 
data other than the identifier and associated keys 
Table 10. Defences for RFID enabled passport systems 
Security requirement Recommendation on how to implement Removes or reduces 
vulnerability to
Transmission Integrity Use data integrity verification techniques (simple one way hashing is a 
good recommendation) to verify the integrity of broadcasts. If any corrup-
tion is detected request a retransmission
Man-in-the-Middle, 
Desynch Attacks,
Mutual Authentication Requires a secure mutual authentication mechanism that allows readers 
and tags to reliably authenticate each other. Can be implemented using 
mechanisms such as BAC (Basic Access Control) or EAC (Extended 
Access Control) which have been standardised for passport security. Lock 
commands using the MRZ (Machine Readable Zone) is also a possibility 
but not recommended. The use of plastic sleeves to prevent unauthorised 
remote access is also possible
Reader Masquerading, 
Cloning, 
Spoofing, 
Data Leakage, 
Man-in-the-Middle, 
Replay Attack, 
Eavesdropping 
Kill/Lock Commands, 
Desynch Attacks, 
Active jamming
Storage Confidentiality Because the owner of the passport may try and access the data stored on 
the tag to clone it or spoof the system storage confidentiality must be 
implemented - Storing the data in encrypted form on the tag and allowing 
only secured access to the keys required to decrypt that data is a option
Physical reading of tags, 
Crypto attacks
Transmission Confi-
dentiality
Extremely important – needs to implement some method of secure encryp-
tion. Can be implemented using traditional security primitives due to the 
high cost of the tags employed. Because tag polling is done at very specific 
areas and only required when the tag is in close proximity of the reader 
tags that specifically have extremely short transmission ranges can also be 
employed.
Man-in-the-Middle, 
Data Leakage, 
Replay Attack, 
Eavesdropping, 
Crypto Attacks
Anonymity Extremely important because passports allows the holder to be tracked. 
While strong mutual authentication and rotating pseudonyms can make 
tracking harder the nature of the system allows for a much simpler system. 
Using a plastic sleeve that blocks all communications to protect the 
passport till the owner arrives at an area where the tag needs to be read is 
possible. Lock commands using the MRZ (machine readable zone) is also 
a possibility
Tag tracking, 
Forward tracing, 
Backward tracing 
Radio finger print tracking,
Data Leakage Protec-
tion
Not really required as nature of the application means tags are polled only 
very infrequently making data leakage a very low threat. Also the tags can 
be built to be pretty sophisticated making radio fingerprint tracking harder
Radio finger print tracking, 
Data leakage
Physical Protection Already at an acceptable level due to readers being in secure areas and the 
tags being attached to important objects (passports) which are secured by 
the owner. Physical protection from owner cannot be implemented.
Physical destruction of compo-
nents
Electronic Protection Use multi frequency RFID tags and short range transmissions to reduce the 
chance of jamming, Use lockout mechanisms to ensure active jamming is 
not possible
Passive jamming 
Active jamming
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on the tag itself, communication of that data via 
a secure means would become a very important 
requirement. Therefore this is also another area 
in RFID security which could benefit from more 
research efforts.
The validation in the last part of this paper 
using the real life case study indicates that there 
are non-electronic means of security that can be 
easily implemented which provide networked 
RFID systems with high security with very low 
overhead in terms of technology and cost (physi-
cal sleeves to protect the RFID embedded page 
of electronic passports) and that policy changes 
can increase security very easily with minimum 
cost and disruption to the system (use of read only 
tags instead of updatable tags). Therefore we also 
recommend that more research be conducted on 
possible non-technical security measures and on 
the possibility of policy and management changes 
which can help improve overall RFID application 
security.
While the security framework presented in this 
chapter has been developed specifically developed 
for networked RFID systems there are a number 
of other systems which greatly resemble this type 
of system. For example sensor networks have 
a large number of similarities with networked 
RFID systems: they both use mobile, low cost 
hardware components that have relatively low 
physical security. The components in both can 
be shared by different independent partners, the 
data generated by the system are used for differ-
ent purposes by different users, both systems are 
highly constrained in terms of the amount and 
power and computation capacity available on 
the mobile nodes and both systems use wireless 
communications for communicating between the 
low cost mobile nosed and the more traditional 
IT components. Therefore it is our belief that the 
framework presented here can be easily translated 
to apply to some other similar systems such as 
sensor networks with minimum modification to 
the core concepts developed in this framework. 
This type of research will not only help secure 
another type of system but it may also help further 
enhance this framework in relation to security it 
affords to networked RFID systems.
CONCLUSION
Even though the deployment of networked RFID 
systems has greatly accelerated in the last few 
years there are still major concerns about the 
security available in systems using low cost tags. 
These concerns arise because of the inherent dif-
ferences in various types of RFID systems and the 
large amount of security threats they are subject 
to. Even though there a large number of security 
frameworks focused on how best to assess and 
secure IT systems implemented using typical 
infrastructure next to no work has been done in 
developing a comprehensive security framework 
for networked RFID systems.
In this paper we develop and present a con-
ceptual security framework that can be used for 
(1) accessing the vulnerabilities of RFID systems, 
(2) identify the attacks possible on them and (3) 
identify the security requirements to fully secure 
that system. Our framework is composed of two 
main parts: the attack model and system model. 
There is also a threat model which is used identify 
the vulnerabilities of the RFID system. Overall 
the framework developed provides a methodical 
manner in which possible attacks and threats on 
a given RFID system can be analyzed and allows 
the user to easily identify the manner in which 
those threats can be removed for that particular 
system. The presented framework is applied to real 
world networked RFID system. The application 
of the framework illustrates how the framework 
can be used to assess and improve the security of 
networked RFID systems
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KEY TERMS AND DEFINITIONS
Attack Model: A conceptual model of a sys-
tem which focuses on identifying and classifying 
the different attacks that can be mounted on that 
system.
Networked RFID Application: A RFID sys-
tem which has components spread over a wide 
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geographic area and have a number of different 
independent partners using and sharing the system 
components and information.
RFID: Radio Frequency Identification
Security Framework: A conceptual model of 
a system which takes into account the above three 
types of models to build a complete framework 
of the systems security requirements.
System Model: A conceptual model of a sys-
tem which focuses on identifying its different com-
ponents and how they communicate and the key 
security concepts required for each component.
Threat Model: A conceptual model of a system 
which focuses on identifying the threats that the 
system faces and analyzing how those threats can 
be leveraged to mounts attacks on the system.
